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A variety of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) has been and is still being 
developed, aiming to make car driving more comfortable and safe, while at the same time 
enhancing traffic efficiency. However, the successful implementation of ADAS is affected by a 
variety of technical and non-technical issues, one of them being possible implications in the 
field of legal liability. Potential liability of system developers and car manufacturers is often 
labelled as a barrier for the rapid deployment of new technology.  
In the present contribution the European Product Liability Directive’s concept of a defective 
product is described and analysed from both a legal and a human factors perspective.  In 
legal debates concerning product liability, generally two different approaches can be 
distinguished, one which is based on consumer expectations and a second which focuses, 
rather, on a risk-benefit analysis. As will be explained, the two may be seen as 
complementary and not as being mutually exclusive.Both tests can only be properly applied 
with the help of human factor expertise.  
1. Introduction  
A variety of Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) has been and is still being rapidly 
developed by the automotive industry. Electronic devices such as route guidance, adaptive 
cruise control, collision avoidance, lane keeping and lateral control systems, inform or 
actively support the driver to improve the critical task of driving a motor vehicle. Potentially, 
these ‘smart’ systems offer important advantages for road safety and driver comfort. 
Furthermore, equipping vehicles and infrastructure with intelligent technology may 
contribute to reduce congestion and the environmental impacts of road traffic.  
The successful implementation of ADAS is affected by a variety of technical and non-
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technical issues, one of them being the liability implications of introducing such new 
technologies in road traffic (RESPONSE 2004; Commission, 2003). As soon as ADAS (in 
active support variant) take over drivers' observations, judgements and decisions, the 
introduction of these systems raise questions about the consequences with respect to legal 
responsibilities for accidents. One of the most prominent question in this context is to what 
extent the use of ADAS may shift liability for road accidents from drivers to car 
manufacturers and system developers and whether current liability regimes are suited to 
accommodate the introduction of ADAS.  
In Europe product liability law is, to an important extent, governed by the European Product 
Liability Directive. This Directive provides a common (but not exclusive) basis for product 
liability claims in the EU. Most important element of this liability regime is the legal concept 
of a ‘defective product’. This article tries to provide some insight in questions of product 
liability in relation to ADAS by analyzing the Directive’s concept of a ‘defective product’ 
from both a legal and a human factors perspective.  
2. The European Product Liability Directive  
The European Council Directive on liability for defective products was adopted in 1985 
(Council Directive 85/374/EEC, OJ 1985, L. 210/29). The first recital of the preamble to the 
Directive explains the motives for drafting this Directive:  
 
“Whereas approximation of the laws of the Member States concerning the liability of the 
producer for damage caused by the defectiveness of his products is necessary because the 
existing divergences may distort competition and affect the movement of goods within the 
common market and entail a differing degree of protection of the consumer against damage 
caused by a defective product to his health or property.”   
 
Article 19 requires Member States to implement the Directive, which means that the Member 
States must bring into force national laws, regulations and administrative provisions 
necessary to comply with the Directive (article 19). The Member States are not allowed to 
deviate from the Directive in favour of manufacturers, nor are they allowed to draw up new 
legislation to impose higher obligations on producers and suppliers or to create higher levels 
of protection for consumers. For example, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) concluded 
that both France and Greece had failed to implement the Directive correctly because they did 
not make provision in its national legislation transposing the Directive for the minimum 
claims threshold of 500 euro (Case C52/00[2002] ECR I-3827 and C -154/00 [2002] ECR I-
3879).  
In addition to the obligation for legislators to implement the Directive in national laws, 
national courts are obliged to interpret national product liability laws in conformity with the 
European Directive when applying them in individual cases (Dommering - van Rongen, 
2000). Furthermore, matters of interpretation of the Directive are eventually to be decided by 
the ECJ.  
Although the European Directive on liability for defective products has an important 
harmonizing effect, it did not result in a complete harmonization of European product 
liability law. The Directive provides a common, but not exclusive, basis for product liability 
claims in the EU. National differences in liability for defective products still exist. (Melzer et 
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al.,  2003). Inter alia, this is because the Directive has a restricted scope and does not affect 
systems of liability under the laws of contract and tort liability, as well as special liability 
systems that existed prior to the Directive. In a recent study, however, it was concluded that 
there is little evidence that disparities between Member States in the practical functioning of 
product liability regime create significant barriers to trade or distortions to competition in the 
EU (Melzer et al.,  2003).  
 
According to the preamble of the Directive its aim is not only to harmonize national product 
liability laws, but also to provide a satisfying level of consumer protection. For this reason 
the Directive did not introduce a system that requires proof of breach of a ‘duty of care’ 
(negligence) but one in which liability is dependent on proving that a product is ‘defective’ 
and that it caused damage.  
The major distinction between traditional fault-based principles of liability and the principle 
of liability under the Directive is that the former focuses on the conduct of the manufacturer 
or supplier (the claimant must identify someone whose act or omission has caused harm and 
must prove that this was attributable to that person’s negligence or by the negligence of an 
employee), whereas the latter focuses on the characteristics of the product, more specifically 
whether the product contains a “defect” that causes damage. The second recital of the 
preamble to the Directive motivates this as follows: 
 
“Whereas liability without fault on the part of the producer is the sole means of adequately 
solving the problem, in particular to our age of increasing technicality, of a fair 
apportionment of the risks inherent in modern technological production.”   
 
However, despite this ‘strict liability’ rhetoric, as Stapleton formulates it, most commentators 
agree that this supposed ‘strict’ character of the liability regime of the Directive should be 
regarded to be rather limited, primarily as a consequence of the problems of establishing 
defectiveness and causation and because of the various defenses available under the Product 
Liability Directive, including the development risk defense (Stapleton, 1994: pp. 236; 
Dommering - van Rongen, 2000: pp. 36; see also Section 4.6). In fact, the liability regime of 
the Directive has often been characterized as ‘superficially strict, but substantially fault-
based’ (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 210-211).  
3. The legal concept of a defective product.   
The most important element of the European Directive is the notion of a defective product. 
According to the Directive the producer shall be liable for damage caused by a defect in his 
product (article 1). Article 6 (1) of the Directive provides a definition of a defective product: 
 
“A product is defective when it does not provide the safety a person is entitled to expect, 
taking all circumstances into account including: 
a) The presentation of the product;  
b) The use the product could reasonably be put to;  
c) The time when the product was put into circulation.” 
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A product being defective in this legal sense means being unsafe rather than inadequate for 
its intended use. In other words the defectiveness of the product will not be determined by its 
fitness for use, but by the level of safety that is reasonably expected of it. Often, these two 
qualifications will overlap, but this is not always the case. A new car that does not start is not 
fit for use, but will not be found defective in the sense of the Directive. However, if electronic 
safety functions of a (newly bought) car suddenly fail this may well establish a safety defect 
that will be relevant in terms of the product liability law.  
A  major difficulty of the definition of a defective product in article 6 of the Directive is its 
vagueness. It fails to provide readily ascertainable objective standards against which a 
manufacturer or a court can measure the safety of a product (Kullmann, 2004: pp. 96; Miller 
and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 354; Dommering - van Rongen, 2000: pp. 43). In fact it could be 
stated that what a person is entitled to expect is the very question that a definition of defect 
should be answering (Stapleton, 1994: pp. 234).  
Because of the vagueness of the concept of “defect”, it might be suggested that the concept 
should be more precisely defined in the Directive. On the other hand, it could be argued that 
it is better not to attempt to define the concept with too much precision, not in the least 
because this could restrict the ability to judges to deal with matters on a case-by-case basis. 
However, it might be expected that in time, as experience of use of the Directive in litigation 
grows, there will emerge a body of case law that will provide a guide to the interpretation of 
the concept of “defect”, i.e. that this concept will come to be clarified in due course by the 
courts of the Member States and the ECJ (Melzer et al., 2003: pp. 48)  
 
Article 6 provides a non-exhaustive list of circumstances which are to be taken into account 
in determining what people generally are entitled to expect in relation to a product.   
 
(a) The presentation of the product;  
The presentation of the product includes all product information such as advertisements, 
instruction manuals, user handbooks and warnings placed on the product. Because of the 
innovative nature of ADAS, the presentation of the product could become a crucial element 
in future product liability claims. Manufacturers can influence the safety expectations of 
consumers (and thereby their liability risk) both positively and negatively by the presentation 
of the product. Inadequate presentation or instructions can thus make a system defective that 
could otherwise be regarded safe enough (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 181). It is of critical 
importance that potential users are not only aware of the functional characteristics but also 
properly understand the operational characteristics of the system, i.e. they understand its 
limitations. Manufacturers are required to keep a careful balance between spelling out system 
limitations and potential dangers with sufficient clarity and emphasis, even when doing that 
would in a way detract significantly from sales. They should refrain from unrealistic claims 
about system performance and should never understate known or potential hazards 
(RESPONSE, 2001: pp. 65). The attention of potential customers is much more easily drawn 
to bright colors, shiny appearance and nice presence than to dry warning messages. 
 
(b) The use the product could reasonably be put to; 
Reasonable anticipated use comprises more than the intended use of a product. In the 
preamble of the Directive it is stated that the defectiveness of the product should be 
determined by reference not to its fitness for use but the lack of safety which the public at 
large is entitled to expect while safety is assessed by excluding any misuse not reasonable 
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under the circumstances. This means that, reasonable anticipated use of ADAS implies that 
manufacturers must take into account all possible users when designing a system and 
deciding on accompanying warnings and instructions, which may include ‘vulnerable’ system 
operators. For instance, in German courts the standard applied is “the least informed and most 
endangered user” (Kulmann, 2004: pp. 98; RESPONSE, 2001: pp. 55). In case of ADAS this 
may concern novices or elderly drivers. Furthermore, it implies that not the most careful 
consumer will be the standard to judge the required safety level of a product, but the average 
driver that may have moments of carelessness and lowered attention (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 
185). For instance, at times when physical fitness is not optimal because of (slight) illness or 
drowsiness. Sub-optimal physical fitness may, for instance, decrease the likelihood of 
detecting malfunctions of the system at hand (Brookhuis et al., 2003b). 
 
(c) The time when the product was put into circulation. 
The time when the product was marketed is also one of the relevant circumstances in 
determining the defectiveness of a product. First of all, the time of marketing relates to the 
state of the industry or the state of the art. The required level of safety that a product should 
provide will be influenced by the availability of safer alternatives on the market. If these are 
available (and economically feasible), perhaps then the product should have been 
(re)designed with safer functional or operational characteristics. This of course does not mean 
that the safest product on the market will be the product liability standard. Other factors, such 
as he price of the product will be relevant as well. One will certainly have greater change to 
survive a car crash in a upper class Mercedes than in a low priced car on the market, but this 
does not mean that the latter one is defective due to lack of ‘crashworthiness’. 
The time of marketing also plays a key role in the so-called ‘development risk defence’. 
According to the Directive, the producer shall not be liable if he proves “that the state of 
scientific and technical knowledge at the time when he put the product into circulation was 
not such as to enable the existence of the defect to be discovered” (article 7 (e) of the 
directive).  
The aim of this development risk clause is that no manufacturer can be held liable if the 
defect in the product was undiscoverable given the state of state of scientific and technical 
knowledge at the time of marketing. The clause was defined in order to establish a 
satisfactory compromise between the need to stimulate innovation and consumers’ legitimate 
expectations for safe products. (Fondazione Rosselli, 2004).   
4. Defectiveness standards and ADAS: consumer expectations versus risk 
benefit  
In legal debates concerning the question how to determine the ‘defectiveness’, i.e. what 
standard to apply to judge a product defective, generally two different approaches are 
highlighted, namely one which is based on consumer expectations and a second which 
focuses, rather, on a risk-benefit analysis. As will be explained, the two may be seen as 
complementary and not as being mutually exclusive (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 355).  
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4.1 Defectiveness standards in relation to manufacturing defects  
From the wording of article 6 – a product is defective when it does not provide the safety a 
person is entitled to expect – it can be concluded that the EC Directive defines "defect" in 
terms of consumer expectations. This consumer expectations standard is an objective one 
(Dommering – van Rongen, 2000: pp. 43), meaning that the expectations of the individual 
consumer are not significant except to the extend that they are a reflection of more general 
public expectations (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 367). In many cases this definition will 
not be a problem in application. For example, no one will expect the brakes of a new car to 
fail.  
More generally, determining consumers’ legitimate expectations will normally not raise 
many problems in relation to so called manufacturing defects. A manufacturing defect exists 
when a product (a vehicle, vehicle parts or vehicle equipment) does not meet the 
manufacturers’ own product specifications. In other words, the product deviates from the 
product-line-standard. It is estimated that 60-70% of the product liability cases concern 
manufacturing defects (Greenpaper Liability for defective products, 1999). Such defects 
might be the result of raw materials or components containing physical flaws or the fact that 
some ‘error’ occurred during the production phase or the assembly into the final product.  For 
example, it could happen that by accident some badly produced sensors have been used in 
one or more ADA-systems. 
4.2 Defectiveness standards in relation to design and presentation defects  
In cases of so-called design and presentation defects the application of a consumer 
expectation test will often become problematic in its application.  Products (vehicles or 
vehicle equipment) that comply with the product-line standard might still be defective in 
terms of product liability law. That is because the product design itself can be unreasonably 
unsafe or instruction or warnings accompanying the product can be considered inadequate.   
These types of potential defects will be particularly relevant in the field of ADAS. Although 
today’s developments in the field of sensor- and computer technology create an enormous 
range of possibilities to enhance drivers’ safety, automating the drivers’ task will also 
introduce new safety concerns that could generate defectiveness claims. For instance, an 
important aspect of these systems is that the input of the system is formed by actual traffic 
conditions. There is a great diversity in traffic conditions (other vehicles, non-motorised road 
users, road geometry, etc.). Based on these conditions the system will decide to warn, brake, 
accelerate or steer automatically. Ideally, testing should include all possible situations. Fact 
is, however, that real world traffic will probably always be more varied than could be 
foreseen in the most comprehensive testing.  
4.3 Human factors and ADAS 
Another safety concern (and potential ‘source of defectiveness’) is the consequence of 
‘human factors’ for ADAS. For instance, drivers’ poor understanding of system performance 
and limitations may lead to dangerous situations. Although the purpose of ADAS is to have a 
positive effect on traffic safety, negative effects on driver behaviour have been found as well, 
and with that, negative effects on traffic safety (Van Winsum, 1997; Hoedemaeker and 
Brookhuis, 1999). Firstly, the provision of information diverts the driver’s attention from 
traffic. Secondly, handing over (part of) the driving task to a co-driver system is sometimes 
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known to produce behavioural adaptation (Dragutinovic et al., 2004). Consequently, either 
the driver might not (or too late) be aware of a sudden hazard, or, is not fit (anymore) for an 
adequate reaction (Brookhuis et al., 2003b). Central problem is that human beings are poor 
‘process monitors’ (Molloy and Parasuraman, 1996), i.e. they are not good in monitoring and 
supervising (automated) systems. Many examples of accidents can be found in the literature, 
where the operator missed crucial signals such as danger indications while monitoring or 
supervising systems. In particular highly automated systems such as found in air transport are 
well-known sources of accidents for that reason. Before introducing any ADAS, the 
consequences of system operation in this sense should be identified and stipulated. 
 
Automation increases reaction time and might even cause complacency (over-reliance). Some 
ADAS studies found evidence for complacency, i.e. excessive reliance on ADAS (De Waard 
et al., 1999; De Waard et al., 2004); others reported loss of driving performance. Ward, 
Fairclough and Humphries (1995) and Ward (1996) found complacency in poor lateral 
position control, and additionally, failure to yield to other traffic was more frequently 
observed in drivers driving a car with an ADAS (in this case Adaptive Cruise Control) 
compared to drivers driving a normal car. Behavioural adaptation should be taken into 
account when investigating the conditions for introduction of ADAS (Verwey, Brookhuis and 
Janssen, 1996; Dragutinovic et al., 2004). 
 
Of additional importance is whether drivers have any trust in automated vehicles, whether 
they will actually reclaim control when required, which driving mode they prefer, and 
whether they will accept supervision over an automated vehicle instead of driving 
themselves. Studies on an Automatic Highway System have demonstrated that drivers 
supervising a fully automated transport system often do not reclaim control in critical 
situations, or at least not in time (Desmond, Hancock and Monette, 1998; De Waard et al., 
1999), whereas this is obviously crucial when supervising a vehicle with passengers or 
dangerous goods. 
 
In a recent driving-simulator study (De Waard et al., 2004) on a hybrid automated public 
transport system on the road, bus-drivers could switch from fully automatic (type: 
underground / metro) to semi-automatic control (type: tram, i.e., longitudinal control operated 
by driver, lateral control by vehicle) to manual (type: bus). The driver was instructed to 
supervise the performance of the vehicle when in (semi)automatic mode and reclaim control 
if necessary. The study shows that drivers in the automatic mode, i.e. being supervisors only, 
did not respond adequately, i.e. in time, to crossing traffic. Training for a couple of hours was 
sufficient to teach the driver how to stay-in-the-loop and respond properly.  
4.4 Problems with a consumer expectations test and the relevance of risk-benefit 
considerations in relation to ADAS 
The question is of course which inherent limitations or harmful side effects could be regarded 
acceptable and which might render an ADA-system to be judged not reasonably safe?  
In some design cases there is no dilemma: where the relevant aspects of the design prevents 
the product performing the task (or the range of tasks) which all would agree such a product 
is expected to perform. For example no one would expect an air bag to deploy when there is 
no accident or the electronic systems in a car to be short-circuiting.  However, in other cases 
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answering the defectiveness question on the (sole) basis of a consumer expectation test is far 
more difficult. It appears to be especially problematic in relation to complex and innovative 
products and obvious and warned dangers (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 357).    
The problem with the application of a consumer expectation test in the context of complex 
and innovative products such as ADAS is that users may have generally no idea how safely a 
product ought to perform in all foreseeable situations, or how safe it should be made against 
all foreseeable hazards (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 403). Furthermore, due to lack of 
experience, expectations of consumers have not yet been sufficiently established to define an 
expected standard of performance.  
Another problematic implication of a consumer expectation test as the sole basis for 
determining design defectiveness is that liability of the manufacturer will be denied in all 
cases where the danger was obvious or warned for. In many cases this will be an appropriate 
outcome: the behaviour of the claimant and not the design or presentation of the product 
should be considered the primary cause of injury (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 377). 
While some modern motor vehicles can speed up to even 200 km/hour, thus creating very 
dangerous situations, we find it hard to imagine that a court will judge such a car defective 
for that reason. Or, to take examples from German case law, manufacturers of chocolate bars 
or liquorice are not liable for damage caused by excessive consumption of their products 
(Brock, 2004; Kempe-Müller and Hieke, 2004; Hannes, 2003).  
The point is that, although the fact that a danger is widely known or obvious will often 
suggest that a product has achieved the level of safety which persons generally are entitled to 
expect, there are also cases where denying liability for patent dangers should be regarded too 
simplistic (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 377). For example, an ADA-system might not be 
excluded from being qualified as defective, because safer design options were available and 
economically feasible. Manufacturers cannot simply restrict their liability for products that do 
not meet an acceptable level of safety by arbitrarily defining only one specific use as 
‘normal’ or by the mere statement that, because systems can be overruled by the driver, 
responsibility remains (entirely) with the driver (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 183; RESPONSE, 
2001: pp. 256). It is their primary duty to market a safe product. This might, for instance, 
imply a duty to design a system in such a way that it cannot be used in a hazardous manner or 
under hazardous circumstances (for instance speed ranges or type of roads the system was not 
designed for).  
4.5 Applying a risk-benefit test 
Although the Directive defines a ‘defect’ in terms of consumer expectations and does not 
provide an explicit defense based on risk-benefit considerations, nonetheless the following 
can be argued. Given the difficulties of applying a consumer expectation test in relation to 
complex and innovative products as well as obvious and warned dangers it seems almost 
inevitable that the standard of safety which persons are entitled to expect will in cases of 
alleged design and presentation defects depend in part on weighing the risks and benefits 
associated with the product. In other words, if judges will assess legitimate  consumer 
expectations the question can soon become one of only being entitled to expect from 
producers what is reasonable (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 356). 
 
It can be defended that a (complementing) risk-benefit approach does also fit in the 
framework of the Directive. Applying a combined consumer expectation-risk-benefit test in 
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cases of complex products and obvious or warned dangers might be judged consistent with 
the wording of the Directive since “all circumstances” should be taken into account in 
determining what persons are generally are entitled to expect (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 
416-417). Or in the words of Stapleton (1994: pp. 236):  
 
“The core of the ‘defect’ enquiry will substantially parallel the issue which underlies the 
negligence standard – the trade-off between risk-taking and social cost as reflected in the 
magnitude and gravity or risk, balanced against the cost of precautions and social utility.” 
 
Until now, however, it seems that the relevance of the risk-benefit analysis in the context of 
the Product Liability Directive regime remains largely unanswered by the courts of the 
Member States and the ECJ (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 362; RESPONSE, 2004: pp. 
104; Melzer et al.,  2003: pp. 47-48). 
 
Although a risk-benefit approach might help to solve some of the problems in applying a 
consumer expectation test (considering consumer expectations just one factor in the 
assessment of defectiveness) it is not without difficulties.   
A first major difficulty associated with a risk-benefit approach is the complexity of assessing 
risks and benefits since balancing factors should be somehow comparable and quantified in 
comparable values, preferably in monetary terms.  
However, design decisions often involve trade-offs between factors of a very different nature. 
For example, a car can be made safer in terms of crashworthiness, but using more metal in 
the car doors to withstand crashes means higher fuel consumption, lower brake efficiency, 
and so on (Stapleton, 1994: pp. 267).  
 
Furthermore, figures on the cost-effectiveness of an alternative design or presentation of an 
alleged defective product are at best crude estimates and generally not available to courts, 
therefore making judgement of courts to a large extent an intuitive one. This may be 
illustrated by the ajudgement of warning defects. Under the Product Liability Directive’s 
strict liability regime, the person injured by a defective product must prove the damage, the 
defect, and the causal relationship between defect and damage. Translated into the context of 
defects through an alleged failure to warn, the causation requirement demands not only that 
claimants prove the feasibility of a warning, but also that, had a warning been provided, they 
would have heeded it, thus avoiding the accident (Stapleton, 1994: pp. 253). Faced with a 
court insisting on proof of the requisite causal link between her injury and the inadequacy of 
warnings, a plaintiff would find little comfort in modern human-factors studies about the 
efficacy of warnings. They reveal that excessive warnings, particularly of obvious hazards, 
are counterproductive causing people to be lulled into a false sense of security. A warning, to 
be effective, should be carefully calibrated in the sense of being decipherable, 
comprehensive, parsimonious, obvious and executable (Wielenga and Brookhuis, 2005). In 
spite of the importance attached to warnings in some product liability cases, both behavioural 
and scientific research shows that most people do not heed them, suggesting that excessive 
warnings are counter-productive, since people become accustomed to warnings and tend to 
ignore all of them. Even when consumers are confronted with adequate warnings, i.e. 
sufficiently adequate to appraise users of the risks and how to use a product safely, they do 
not always read, understand, remember, or comply. Psychological and consumer behaviour 
studies show that inattention to warnings is the inevitable result of limitations in cognitive 
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capacity, memory, attention –span or capacity, and time-pressure. Warnings may also fail 
because people (willingly) ignore them and rely on explanations provided by human 
intermediaries or on so-called general knowledge and experience (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: 
pp. 470).  
 
4.6 Problem awareness: the discoverablity of risks   
Another problem with the application of a risk-benefit test is that risks need to be known 
before taking them into account in the design and the presentation of the product. This is also 
expressed in the Directive’s so-called Development Risk Clause which stipulates that no 
manufacturer can be held liable if the defect in the product was undiscoverable given the state  
of scientific and technical knowledge at the time of marketing . However, the problem is that 
knowledge about product risks often emerges slowly. This may be so because such risks were 
not yet subject of scientific curiosity or creativity, or because evidence of risks accumulates 
and the data on a causal relationship need to be sufficient to be statistically relevant. This will 
also be true for ADAS. Although behavioural scientists warn for the potential risks following 
from automating the driver’s task in terms of poor comprehensibility of system performance, 
decreasing levels of attention and complacency, the quantification of the risks is far from 
easy (see Brookhuis, De Waard and Fairclough, 2003). 
 
Although the Directive provides a possible defense for manufacturers if the defect in the 
product was undiscoverable given the state of scientific and technical knowledge at the time 
of marketing, it may be assumed that in fields of innovative technology such as ADAS, 
manufacturers cannot passively rely on the current state of knowledge. In areas of rapid 
innovative development which may outstrip existing safety research, a heavy burden rests on 
manufacturers to discover what aspects of their products may be harmful. (Miller and 
Goldberg, 2004: pp. 514). They have an obligation to actively investigate the possible 
dangers of their product, including human factors (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 199; RESPONSE, 
2001: pp. 269).  This implies for instance the investigation of driving behaviour of different 
driver categories in experimental situations (RESONSE, 2001: pp. 270). 
 
However, the Directive gives no guidance as to what are sufficient measures to enable a 
defect to be discovered (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 199; Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 507). In 
other words, how much time and effort should be spent on identifying potential hazards 
before they may be called undiscoverable? Again, this seems a question which can only be 
determined by some notion of what is reasonable to expect of the defendant (Stapleton, 1994: 
pp. 241), i.e. by some risk-benefit test (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 507).  
In relation to the ‘discoverability’ of a defect, it should be emphasized that defects which 
remain undetected and unappreciated by what may be termed limited general knowledge are 
treated differently and do not allow the defendant to utilize the development risk defence. 
This is because the defect may not be unforeseen, not through a lack of scientific and 
technical knowledge, but because of the failure to put obvious facts together to appreciate and 
eliminate (or reduce) risks (Miller and Goldberg, 2004: pp. 515; Van Wees, 2004: pp. 200).  
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4.7 Acceptance of risks  
A last and important difficulty in applying a risk-benefit test in the context of the product 
liability law is the fact that some risk of the same magnitude (in terms of persons killed or 
wounded, etc.) are more acceptable than others. In other words, social and legal acceptance 
also depends on the type of risk.   
From a legal perspective this can be illustrated by the apparent exclusion of the development 
risk defense in relation to manufacturing defects.  It is broadly assumed that the fact that such 
incidental defects can not always be detected and prevented, not even with the most advanced 
control measures, this will not exclude the producer from liability (Miller and Goldberg, 
2004: pp. 395; Stapleton, 1994: pp. 248). The German Federal Supreme Court  also expressed 
this view in a case were a person was injured as a result of an exploding bottle of mineral 
water (BGH 5 may, 1995; ZIP, 1995: pp. 1094). This was caused by a very fine hairline crack 
that was not practically detectable before bringing it in circulation (there had been seven 
inspections by the bottler). The German Federal Supreme Court’s verdict was nevertheless 
that the bottle of mineral water was defective because it did not guarantee a degree of safety 
which may justifiably be expected, taking all circumstances into account.  
It seems that in case of manufacturing defects, no account is being taken of risk-benefit 
considerations. The rationale behind this reasoning is that the damage caused by these 
incidental production errors should not rest on the individual product user that was so 
unfortunate to be confronted with this ‘below production-line-standard product’, but should 
rest upon the manufacturer who is able to spread these liability cost over the whole 
community of product buyers. Liability for manufacturing defects is therefore normally not 
controversial.  Not surprisingly, these claims regarding manufacturing defects are typically 
settled outside court (Stapleton, 1994: pp. 252). 
Questions of the relative acceptability of risks in the context of the Product Liability 
Directive also rise in cases of defects or risks which are known in general terms, but are 
entirely unpredictable and undetectable in their incidence. These types of defects or risks may 
also be an issue in relation to ADAS, primarily because of the technical difficulty to design 
intelligent software-based systems that are able to deal with all situations that may be 
encountered in daily life traffic. For example, ideally, software should be designed in such a 
way that a system would function in a predictable and safe manner under all circumstances. 
However, conditions in real life traffic will probably always be more varied than was 
foreseen in the most comprehensive design and testing process. It is assumed that in practice 
it is impossible to produce bug-free software. Full pre-circulation screening for complex 
software programs in ADAS would be, if feasible at all, astronomically expensive. The 
question is however, whether the practical impossibility to design bug free software should be 
a defense for the manufacturer who is confronted with the poor fellow who tragically 
‘discovered’ the software bug.  
It may be doubted that in these types of cases courts will allow a manufacturer to defend 
himself on the basis of a risk-benefit argument, i.e. that the general benefits to society 
outweigh these incidentally and unpredictably manifesting risks (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 235).   
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5. Conclusions and final remarks  
Potential liability of manufacturers and suppliers is often labeled as a constraint for the 
introduction of ADAS. Most important element of the European Product Liability Directive 
is the legal concept of a ‘defective product’. The Directive basically defines a defect in terms 
of a consumer expectation test: a product is defective when it does not provide the safety a 
person is entitled to expect. Although a consumer expectation standard will in many cases not 
lead to problems in its application – no one will expect the brakes of a new car to fail or an 
ACC-system to prevent control of the brakes - in other cases, especially cases of alleged 
design or warning defects, it may be a problem. This is particularly true in relation to: 1) 
complex and innovative products 2) obvious or warned dangers. The difficulties in applying a 
consumer expectation test as the sole basis for assessing defectiveness, seems to create the 
need for an additional risk-benefit analysis to establish whether an ADAS is defective. It can 
also be defended that elements of a risk-benefit test can be fitted in the framework of the 
Directive, because the Directive allows courts to take all circumstances into account. 
However, case law is not clear on the matter. 
Although a risk-benefit approach may help to solve some of the problems in developing and 
applying a consumer expectation test (considering consumer expectations just one factor in 
the assessment of defectiveness), it is not without difficulties.  
First of all, design decisions in many cases involve trade-offs between factors of a different 
nature (for example comfort versus safety) that are difficult to balance in a cost-benefit 
analysis. Furthermore, figures on cost and benefits are often only crude estimates at best, 
making court judgments to a large extent intuitive. Finally, in cases of a manufacturing 
defect, risk-benefit considerations are not likely to be taken into account because it is felt that 
the damage caused by (incidental) production errors should not rest on the individual product 
user.          
 
Despite the fact that some important factors can be identified that will be relevant for 
determining the potential defectiveness of an ADAS, it has been made clear in this 
contribution that no hard and fast rules can be given to answer the question what will be safe 
enough. This may certainly make manufacturers feel uncomfortable. However, one should 
not rush into categorical statements about product liability as a barrier for market 
introduction. On the one hand it is basically a valuable principle that judges take all the 
relevant circumstances into account. One of these circumstances, for instance, will be the 
possibilities for producers – also considering the burden in terms of costs, time and trouble - 
of taking precautionary measures against the inherent shortcomings and resulting dangers of 
ADAS. It forces manufacturers to carefully design, introduce and monitor their systems. 
Product liability stresses the responsibility of the industry and is far more flexible than 
vehicle safety regulation (Van Wees, 2004: pp. 234; Van der Heijden and Van Wees, 2001).  
 
This being said, however, we could still agree that it would be undesirable if system 
developers and car manufacturers are discouraged to develop and market ADAS only because 
the (perceived) liability risks are too high. Product liability is often labeled as an important 
‘show stopper’ for the market introduction. Certainly, more advanced ADAS such as anti-
collision systems that intervene in critical situations, will because of the consequences 
potentially raise serious and difficult product liability questions which may need some legal 
intervention.  
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However, one should not put all the blame on liability. First of all, the threat of product 
liability will have a preventive effect, helping to keep immature or poorly designed 
technology off the market. Secondly, an important observation in this respect is that, although 
product liability is getting a lot of attention in the legal literature, case law on the subject, 
especially in relation to the automotive sector, is rather rare. Of course, this may certainly not 
be considered the only indication whether or not product liability must be regarded as a threat 
for the deployment of ADAS. For instance, most claims will probably not reach court, 
because manufacturers prefer settlement outside court. Collecting evidence about such 
settlements is almost an impossible task (Fondazione Rosselli, 2004: pp. 9) It appears, 
however  that in Europe (automotive) producers are, in contrast to the United States, until 
now not burdened with a great number of claims (Reimann 2003; Van Wees 2000; Castaign, 
1994). Recent evaluations of the Product Liability Directive did not reveal any serious 
problems of the automotive industry with this Directive either. Furthermore, the introduction 
of other innovative automotive technologies such as navigation systems, ABS, ESP or ACC 
do not seem to be seriously limited by the impact of the product liability law. Of course this 
does not mean that new technologies will not raise new liability concerns for manufacturers. 
There may always be opportunistic claimants trying to shift their damages based on the 
argument that the manufacturer should have brought a safer system on the market or that the 
presentation or the lack of warnings/instructions rendered the product defective. This, 
however, does not mean that such a claim will be accepted in court.  
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